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INTRODUCTION 
The facts of Pleasant Grove City v. Summum1 are well known by now: 
Summum, a small religious group, argued that Pleasant Grove City violated 
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when it refused to display 
Summum‘s monument in the city‘s Pioneer Park, which already contained 
fifteen other monuments, including a Ten Commandments display.  Sum-
mum‘s unlikely claim won in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, a request 
for rehearing was denied, and the case ultimately was heard before the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  During the oral arguments, the Justices (along with com-
mentators, Court watchers, and, of course, the litigants themselves) were 
fully aware that the Summum litigation presented a double-edged sword.  If 
Pleasant Grove argued too vigorously the theory that the existing Ten 
Commandments monument constitutes the city‘s own message, then it 
risked violating the Establishment Clause in a follow-up lawsuit based on 
the same facts.  If, on the other hand, Pleasant Grove attributed the monu-
ment‘s message to its 1971 donor,2 then the city would be hard-pressed to 
explain why Pioneer Park was not, as Summum claimed, a public forum 
that must be potentially open to all monuments without discrimination 
based on content or viewpoint. 
The tension pervaded the oral argument.  Chief Justice Roberts opened 
the discussion with an observation that the city was in a double-bind.3  Jus-
tice Scalia guided the city‘s lawyer into a discussion of Van Orden v. Per-





  Jessie D. Puckett, Jr. Lecturer and Associate Professor, University of Mississippi School of Law.  
Thanks to Nakimuli Davis and Phil Letendre for their research assistance.  Thanks also to the Lamar Or-
der for research support. 
1
  129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (link). 
2
  The Fraternal Order of Eagles donated the Ten Commandments monument in 1971.  Id. at 1129. 
3
  Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (No. 07-665), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-665.pdf (link) (―[Y]ou‘re real-
ly just picking your poison, aren‘t you?‖). 
4
  545 U.S. 677 (2005) (link). 
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Ten Commandments display.5  Justice Souter pondered the possibility of 
discrimination.6  And Summum‘s lawyer frankly acknowledged that the city 
was ―on the horns of a dilemma‖ facing either a Free Speech or an Estab-
lishment Clause violation.7  Ultimately, however, the U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously decided that in selecting monuments for Pioneer Park the city 
was engaged in government speech; the city could therefore control the 
content of its message without violating the Free Speech Clause.8  Signifi-
cantly, the Court found that the city need not formally adopt the message of 
an existing park monument in order for that monument to constitute gov-
ernment speech.9  The stage was set for Summum‘s Establishment Clause 
claim, but that claim would have to wait for another day. 
Nonetheless, it was precisely those Establishment Clause concerns—
for both the litigants and the Justices—that appeared to drive the litigation 
and, ultimately, the decision.  The possibility of a future Establishment 
Clause claim informed Summum‘s strategy to frame the arguments in the 
terms on which it ―wanted to lose.‖10  Many assumed that the same possibil-
ity explained Pleasant Grove‘s decision to decline Summum‘s demand that 
the city formally adopt the message of the Ten Commandments.11  Liberal, 
separationist Justices likely sought to avoid a ruling that would potentially 
immunize monuments from future Establishment Clause challenges on the 
ground that such monuments are private, rather than government, speech.12  
The conservative, accommodationist wing of the Court, on the other hand, 
considered whether a finding of government speech would doom Pleasant 





  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (No. 07-665).  In a companion 
case, McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, the Court struck down a different Ten Commandments 
display on Establishment Clause grounds.  545 U.S. 844 (2005) (link). 
6
  Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (No. 07-665). 
7
  Id. at 63. 
8
  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129. 
9
  Id. at 1134. 
10
  2008–2009 Supreme Court Term (C-SPAN television broadcast July 6, 2009) (remarks of Pamela 





  See, e.g., Ian Bartrum, Pleasant Grove v.  Summum: Losing the Battle to Win the War, 95 VA. L. 
REV. IN BRIEF 43, 44 (2009), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2009/05/16/bartrum.pdf (link). 
12
  This is the explanation Pamela Harris provides, see 2008–2009 Supreme Court Term, supra note 
10, and it is a plausible one given that the two Justices who have advocated applying the Establishment 
Clause endorsement test to private speech in a public forum, Justices Souter and O‘Connor, are no long-
er on the Court.  See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 772–83, 783–94 
(1995) (O‘Connor & Souter, J.J., concurring) (link). 
13
  Of course, the 2005 McCreary and Van Orden decisions at least provide the criteria for argu-
ments by analogy in most Ten Commandments cases.  Justice Scalia made one such argument in his 
Summum concurrence, wherein he concluded that the Pleasant Grove Decalogue passed the standards for 
constitutionality set forth in Van Orden.  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139–1140 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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the Justices likely considered the impending decision in Salazar v. Buono,14 
an Establishment Clause case carried over from the 2008–2009 to the 2009–
2010 term.15  In light of the fact that the Establishment Clause cast a shadow 
over the Summum case, we should pay particular attention to the Summum 
opinion for any gestures in the direction of the Establishment Clause. 
In a 2009 mini-symposium in the Northwestern University Law Re-
view Colloquy, legal scholars discussed the potential impact and meaning 
of the unanimous decision in Summum.16  Like this Essay, Professors 
Lund‘s and Meyler‘s essays point out some of the intricacies of the case.  
Professor Meyler‘s playful opening motif refers to some of the same parts 
of the oral argument that caught my attention, presumably because those 
exchanges point out the significance of the Establishment Clause.17  Both 
Professors Lund and Meyler discuss the legal disputes surrounding legisla-
tive prayer and the potential impact of Summum on those controversies.18  
Professor Lund also includes a discussion of the Supreme Court‘s equal 
access cases.  He argues that there is a conceptual incongruity between the 
Court‘s approach in Summum, which denied the free speech claim of the re-
ligionists seeking access to the park, and the line of cases in which the 
Court has ruled in favor of religious groups seeking access to public facili-
ties.19  All of the symposium pieces acknowledge that the Establishment 
Clause is a player in the case.  Nonetheless, the Summum decision raises an 
important question that has yet to be discussed: What about monuments, 
symbols, and the continued validity of the endorsement test? 
Justice Alito, writing for all but Justice Souter, authored the majority 
opinion in Summum.  He went to great pains to establish two key points: (1) 
the holding in the case—that permanent monuments are government 





  Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 
129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (link). 
15
  Buono involves a transfer of a piece of land in the Mojave Desert atop of which sits a Latin cross 
donated to the federal government by the Veterans of Foreign Wars.  Id.  The oral argument in Buono 
occurred on October 7, 2009.  Docket for Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (No. 08-472), available at 
http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/08-472.htm (link).  A decision is expected this term. 
16
  See Christopher C. Lund, Keeping the Government’s Religion Pure: Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 46 (2009), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/28/LRColl2009n28Lund.pdf (link); Nelson 
Tebbe, Privatizing and Publicizing Speech, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70 (2009), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/30/LRColl2009n30Tebbe.pdf (link); Joseph 
Blocher, Property and Speech in Summum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 83 (2009), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/31/LRColl2009n31Blocher.pdf (link); Ber-
nadette Meyler, Summum and the Establishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 95 (2009), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/32/LRColl2009n32Meyler.pdf (link). 
17
  Meyler, supra note 16, at 95–96. 
18
  See id. at 100–05; Lund, supra note 16, at 55–57. 
19
  See Lund, supra note 16 at 53–55.  Professor Bartrum argues essentially the same point.  See Bar-
trum, supra note 11 at 45–46. 
104:280 (2010) Pleasant Grove City v. Summum 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/5/ 283 
sages monuments send are often unclear.20  Unlike the tension Professor 
Lund identifies with respect to the access cases, the Court‘s dicta create an 
explicit and therefore unavoidable tension with the endorsement test.  Jus-
tice Alito‘s dicta about the ambiguity of messages conveyed by monuments 
suggest that either the Court‘s observation in Summum is accurate or a fun-
damental assumption underlying the endorsement test is accurate.  Both 
cannot be. 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE ENDORSEMENT TEST 
To understand the conflict between the endorsement test and the Sum-
mum opinion, it is necessary to briefly review how the Court has applied the 
endorsement test in the context of religious display cases.  Justice 
O‘Connor introduced the endorsement test in her concurrence in Lynch v. 
Donnelly,21 which upheld a public crèche display, and in doing so she ex-
plained her view of government endorsement prohibited by the Establish-
ment Clause.  Justice O‘Connor‘s test asks whether the government‘s 
actions ―send[] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to ad-
herents that they are insiders, favored members of the political communi-
ty.‖22  The endorsement test subsumed the earlier Lemon test‘s inquiry into 
the intent and effect of the government‘s actions, but it settled decidedly on 
the effect.23  By definition, a finding of endorsement depends on the exis-
tence of a discernible message.  The arbiter of the message is the ―reasona-
ble observer,‖ a construct O‘Connor repeatedly defended against 
complaints that the doctrinal reasonable observer was either too touchy, too 
permissive, or a mere mask for a judge‘s own sensibilities in either direc-
tion.24 
Nonetheless, Justice O‘Connor‘s endorsement test gained traction in 
the next religious display case following Lynch, County of Allegheny v. 





  Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1135 (2009) (―What, for example, is ‗the mes-
sage‘ of the Greco-Roman mosaic of the word ‗Imagine‘ that was donated to New York City‘s Central 
Park in memory of John Lennon?‖). 
21
  465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding constitutionality of public crèche display) (link). 
22
  Id. at 688 (O‘Connor, J., concurring). 
23
  See Lisa Shaw Roy, The Establishment Clause and the Concept of Inclusion, 83 OR. L. REV. 1, 
17 (2004).  It certainly would be the rare case in which the government intends to send an outsider mes-
sage.  Cf. Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J. L. & POL. 499, 523 
(2002) (―Most government action that alienates or offends people because it is seen as approving or en-
dorsing religion is not the product of a deliberate government effort to be pejorative toward those who 
are aggrieved.‖). 
24
  See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779–82 (1995) (O‘Connor, 
J., concurring); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 524 U.S. 1, 33 (2004) (O‘Connor, J., concur-
ring) (link). 
25
  492 U.S. 573 (1989) (link). 
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crèche display but uphold a separate display that consisted of a Christmas 
tree and a menorah.26  Six years later the Court heard Capitol Square v. Pi-
nette,27 a case that Summum argued was the factual and legal predicate for 
its own challenge.28  In Pinette, the Court held that the Ku Klux Klan had a 
Free Speech right to erect a Latin cross on the statehouse plaza in Colum-
bus, Ohio.29  The issue before the Court was whether, as the state review 
board had argued, the board‘s permission to erect the cross on the capitol 
square would amount to a forbidden establishment of religion.30  Justice 
Scalia‘s plurality opinion referred to the endorsement test as the ―so-called 
‗endorsement test‘‖;31 he applied it with some discussion of the ―reasona-
ble‖ and ―intelligent‖ observer, but with no discussion of any message of 
alienation or outsider status.32 
Then, in 2005, after a long break from cases involving religious dis-
plays, the Court handed down opposing decisions in a pair of Ten Com-
mandments cases, McCreary County v. ACLU33 and Van Orden v. Perry.34  
In McCreary, Justice Souter‘s majority opinion revived the Lemon test35 but 
imported the concept of the reasonable observer, finding that a reasonable 
observer would know that the county‘s Ten Commandments display was 
fueled by a purpose to advance religion.36  By contrast, in Van Orden, then-
Chief Justice Rehnquist‘s plurality opinion found a display of the Ten 
Commandments on the Texas capitol mall to be merely an acknowledgment 
of religion, with no mention of the endorsement test or the reasonable ob-
server.37 
The Court‘s next religious display case was Summum.  Although the 
Establishment Clause was not an issue in the case, the Court‘s opinion con-





  Id. 
27
  515 U.S. 753. 
28
  See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1138 (2009); Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 61, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (No. 07-665), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-665.pdf. 
29
  Pinette, 515 U.S. 753. 
30
  Id. at 757. 
31
  Id. at 763 (plurality opinion). 
32
  Id. at 763–70. 
33
  545 U.S. 844 (2005) (striking down Ten Commandments display as unconstitutional). 
34
  545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding Ten Commandments display as constitutional). 
35
  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (link).  In the Court‘s first Ten Command-
ments case, Stone v. Graham, the Court used Lemon to invalidate a Kentucky statute requiring that a Ten 
Commandments display be posted on public elementary and secondary schools‘ classroom walls.  449 
U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (link). 
36
  McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862–69. 
37
  See Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677. 
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II. SUMMUM‘S DISCUSSION OF MONUMENTS AND MESSAGES 
Consider first what Justice Alito‘s opinion for the Court observes about 
monuments and what the government may intend to convey: ―A monument, 
by definition, is a structure that is designed as a means of expression.  
When a government entity arranges for the construction of a monument, it 
does so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill some feeling in 
those who see the structure.‖38  This language is consistent with the under-
pinnings of the endorsement test, which proceeds on the assumption that 
monuments send clear messages.  Of particular note is the fact that Alito‘s 
formulation recognizes the role of government intent39 (usually discussed in 
the Establishment Clause context in terms of whether the government has a 
religious purpose40) and his use of the word ―feeling,‖ which seizes onto the 
character of the constitutional harm used by some who criticize the en-
dorsement test.41  Justice Alito explains that ―privately financed and donated 
monuments that the government accepts and displays to the public on gov-
ernment land‖ also speak for the government.42  Thus, the Court‘s observa-
tion covers nearly every public religious display that has been the subject of 
church-state litigation.43 
The trouble for the endorsement test begins in Part IV of the opinion.  
In that portion of the decision the Court rejects Summum‘s argument that a 
municipality should be required to formally adopt the message associated 
with a monument in order to demonstrate that it constitutes government and 
not private speech.44  Rather, the Court found to the contrary, explaining 
that a government may engage in expressive conduct through a monument 
even if no formal message has been identified and embraced.  The Court 
noted: 
 
[Summum‘s] argument fundamentally misunderstands the 
way monuments convey meaning . . . .  Even when a mo-





  Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1133 (2009). 
39
  Likewise, privately donated monuments displayed on public property ―are meant to convey and 
have the effect of conveying a government message, and they thus constitute government speech.‖  Id. at 
1134. 
40
  See, e.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 881; Stone, 449 U.S. at 41. 
41
  See, e.g., Roy, supra note 23, at 33–39 (2004); Choper, supra note 23, at 529. 
42
  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133.  
43
  The only monuments Justice Alito‘s observation does not directly include are government dis-
plays on private property, such as the crèche in Lynch and, curiously, the Latin cross in Buono—at least 
if the Court recognizes the land transaction that deeded the portion of government land on which the 
cross was perched back to the VFW.   
44
  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134–36. 
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intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted by 
different observers, in a variety of ways.45 
 
The Court observed, for example, that the ―Imagine‖ mosaic in Central 
Park and an Arkansas statue displaying the word ―peace‖ in many world 
languages are examples of monuments ―almost certain to evoke different 
thoughts and sentiments in the minds of different observers.‖46  The Court 
found the message of monuments containing no text ―likely to be even 
more variable.‖47  Because it ―frequently is not possible to identify a single 
‗message‘ that is conveyed by an object or structure,‖ the Court reasoned, 
the government‘s intended message might differ from that of its creator or 
donor.48 
So how does such language affect the Court‘s Establishment Clause ju-
risprudence generally and the endorsement test in particular?  Summum 
would not preclude the Court from finding under Lemon that the govern-
ment has a religious purpose that is completely aligned with its donor,49 and 
that finding need not be based on the asserted message conveyed by a mo-
nument.  The endorsement test, on the other hand, requires a judge to dis-
cern a single, identifiable message of exclusion conveyed by a monument to 
the reasonable observer.  The Summum opinion seriously undermines the 
proposition that a monument sends only one message or any particular mes-
sage.  Likewise, the Court‘s discussion in Summum seems to exclude the 
possibility of a reasonable observer, another important feature of the en-
dorsement test, either as an actual person or as a judicial amalgam of a 
range of different observers.  Indeed, this lengthy discussion of messages 
creates a nuanced, open-ended view of the impact on passers-by of public 
displays that is at odds with the Court‘s jurisprudence applying the en-
dorsement test. 
In terms of the other opinions in Summum, it is useful to note that in 
the concurring opinions in Summum, Justice Scalia applies Van Orden to 
the city‘s existing Ten Commandments display without mentioning the en-
dorsement test.50  Justice Souter, meanwhile, again raises the reasonable ob-
server, though this time to argue that it should be used to determine whether 





  Id. at 1135.  Professor Carol Nackenoff argues that this language obscures the possibility that the 
government may favor one particular speaker‘s viewpoint over others.  Carol Nackenoff, The Dueling 
First Amendments: Government as Funder, as Speaker, and the Establishment Clause, 69 MD. L. REV. 
132, 144–45 (2009) (citing concerns raised in Justice Souter‘s concurrence in Summum). 
46
  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135. 
47
  Id. 
48
  Id. at 1136.  
49
  Cf. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (invalidating Ten Command-
ments display on the ground that the government acted with a ―predominantly religious purpose‖). 
50
  See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139–40 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
51
  Id. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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Judge Tacha‘s dissent to the dissents in the Court of Appeals‘s decision in 
Summum recognized and applied the endorsement test‘s core inquiry 
(though Judge Tacha was ultimately wrong about how the Court would re-
solve the government speech issue).52  Tacha argued that the government‘s 
display of a religious monument sends an ―ancillary message‖ to nonadhe-
rents that they are political outsiders.53 
It is possible that the Court‘s opinion in Summum could be parsed fine-
ly enough to distinguish between a monument‘s religious message and a 
perceived exclusionary message sent by a government‘s display of that mo-
nument in a public setting.  However, the language of the Court‘s opinion 
seems to rule out in advance the possibility of an outsider message that is 
perceptible to a reasonable observer.  According to the language in Sum-
mum, it is not necessarily clear what the government‘s actual message is; 
different observers walk away from the same monument with different 
messages.  Without the input of the authoritative reasonable observer, it 
would seem that the interpretation of a monument‘s message is entirely sub-
jective. 
Whether the Court‘s reasoning in Summum is an inattentive blow to an 
earlier insight about public religious displays, or a potential improvement to 
a doctrine built on artificial assumptions about shared public space, it would 
seem that the Court in Summum is making basic assertions about the nature 
of reality that contradict its existing doctrine.  This contradiction may have 
little practical significance, however, if the endorsement test is no longer 
viable. 
III. THE STATUS OF THE ENDORSEMENT TEST AFTER SUMMUM 
Given its decreased use in recent years, one might be tempted to con-
clude that even before Summum the endorsement test—at least as it was 
originally framed by Justice O‘Connor—is a dead letter.  The Court has not 
explicitly relied on it in a case involving a religious display since County of 
Allegheny.  Even Justice Souter, an ardent defender of the reasonable ob-
server, did not apply the endorsement test in the most recent pair of cases 
involving the Ten Commandments.  Perhaps expediency caused the Court 
to adopt O‘Connor‘s formulation given her role as the crucial swing vote in 
many cases.  Now, however, with both Justices O‘Connor and Souter no 
longer on the Court, there are no remaining justices with an ideological 





  Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007) (Tacha, J., responding to 
dissent from denial of rehearing en banc) (link). 
53
  Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309–10 (2000) (link)). 
54
  It remains to be seen what the addition of Justice Sotomayor means for the endorsement test in 
particular and the Establishment Clause in general.  In at least one of her decisions as a district court 
judge, she ruled in favor of a plaintiff who wanted to erect a menorah in a public park during the holi-
days.  Flamer v. City of White Plains, 841 F. Supp. 1365 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (link).  Judge Sotomayor re-
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given that there appears to be (at least in the display cases) an accommoda-
tionist majority.55 
Yet scholars and observers who have spent any time with the Supreme 
Court‘s church and state decisions have learned that one can seldom predict 
the next doctrinal turn.  The Lemon test has survived many near-death expe-
riences, only to resurface in a case involving the Ten Commandments.56  
There is the elusive requirement of neutrality, which one wing of the Court 
appears to oppose in the access and funding cases57 and the other opposes in 
the symbol and display cases.58  Finally, the history test in Marsh v. Cham-
bers59 is (presumably) held in reserve for the rare case in which a particular 
practice has a direct, historical antecedent.  And that is just to name a few 
examples.  Perhaps we should pay attention to the jurisprudence of Justice 
Breyer, the crucial swing vote in Van Orden; he candidly stated in that case 
that he could perceive ―no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal 
judgment.‖60 
Putting aside general thoughts about unpredictability, however, there is 
another, specific reason to pay attention to Summum‘s conflict with the en-
dorsement test in the context of cases involving symbols and displays.  My 
initial title for this Essay was: ―If Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test is 
alive, does Justice Alito’s opinion in Summum kill it?‖  Fleshing out the 
conflict between Summum and the endorsement test tells us more about 
whether the endorsement test is likely to resurface again, and that small 
piece of information may be helpful going forward, particularly as we await 
the decision in Salazar v. Buono.61 
                                                                                                                           
solved the city‘s Establishment Clause defense by finding the park to be a public forum open to private 
speakers on equal terms.  Id. at 1376–82. 
55
  See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Kennedy is often a swing vote, but in the context of 
public religious displays he has explicitly rejected the endorsement test.  See id. at 664 (noting that pass-
ers-by are free to ―turn their backs‖ to the offense of government speech). 
56
  Compare, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005), with Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (1993) (anticipating the demise of Lemon after 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (link)).    
57
  See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 863 (1995) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (link). 
58
  See, e.g., McCreary, 545 U.S. at 889 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
59
  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (finding legislative prayer constitutional based on the 
history of the practice at the time of the framing of the First Amendment) (link). 
60
  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
61
  Salazar is not likely to reach the merits of whether a Latin cross on public land violates the Estab-
lishment Clause, though at least Justice Scalia raised the issue at oral argument.  Transcript of Oral Ar-
gument at 6–8, Salazar v. Buono, No. 08-472 (U.S. argued Oct. 7, 2009), available at 
www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-472.pdf (link). 
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CONCLUSION 
Whatever the status of the Court‘s Establishment Clause doctrine prior 
to Summum, this government speech case has something to say about Jus-
tice O‘Connor‘s endorsement test.62  Justice Alito‘s opinion in Summum 
points out that the government has a legitimate role as a speaker, bringing 
balance to the endorsement test‘s exclusive focus on what some observers 
may prefer not to see.  The Court‘s ambivalence about whether a govern-
ment monument sends a discernible message may signal that the Court is 
prepared to dial back an earlier view.  Nor should it be lost on the reader 
that the author of the majority opinion in Summum, Justice Alito, assumed 






  Cf. Richard M. Esenberg, Must God Be Dead or Irrelevant: Drawing a Circle That Lets Me In, 
18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3 (2009) (―Summum . . . does not itself alter our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. . . .  Nevertheless, Summum‘s recognition that government speech may convey a number 
of messages, and that evenhandedness in that speech is impractical, suggests further clarification of just 
when and how government speech is limited by the Establishment Clause.‖). 
